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should be sacrificed for our benefit. When 
pressed to provide a rational defense for the 
belief in human pre-eminence, philosophers 
have argued that our autonomous, richly 
complex lives warrant our special status. 
Few, however, have argued that humans who 
are incapable of autonomy may properly be 
sacrificed to further the interests of normal 
humans. 
It was inevitable that this prima facie 
inconsistency would be challenged. Writers 
like Peter Singer and Tom Regan advanced 
the argument from marginal cases to show 
that our differential treatment of impaired 
humans and many other animals is morally 
suspect. 1 If it is wrong to use a severely 
retarded human to test the effects of toxic 
gas, let alone as a main course, isn't it also 
wrong to use a nonhuman with equivalent or 
higher mental capacities? On the other hand, 
if autonomy or personhood is necessary for 
a right to life (perhaps even for moral 
considerability), then it would be 
permissible to kill humans who lack those 
attributes. If such humans do after all have 
a right to life, then, it has been urged, we 
must look beyond personhood for the source 
of that right.2 In any case, according to the 
challenge, our attitudes toward very 
mentally impaired humans and many 
nonhumans require readjustment. 
Many have responded to this challenge by 
retorting that severely retarded humans are 
due full moral respect because they are 
humans, members of our own species. When 
asked w.b.Y. this fact should count morally, 
they often found their inability to answer no 
cause for concern. E. g., the Chairman of 
Harvard University's Department of 
Philosophy has acknowledged that "it is not 
easy to explain why membership in the 
human species does and should have moral 
weight with us," addil1g that "nothing much.. 
.should be inferred from our not presently 
havihg a theory of the moral importance of 
sp~cies membership that no one has spent 
much time trying to formulate because the 
issue hasn't seemed pressing."3 
For those who continue to think that it is not 
wrong to eat and vivisect nonhumans, but 
indefensible to do so to even less well 
mentally endowed humans, the issue should 
be very pressing indeed. They stand accused 
of moral inconsistency by two very 
different groups. Those who have become 
convinced that moral considerability is not 
restricted to humanity are urging that we 
cease even the painless exploitation of 
non humans. According to quite another, 
very disturbing view, we should consider 
exploiting mentally defective humans in 
addition to nonhumans. E. g., R. G. Frey has 
recently argued that consistency requires us 
to choose between antivivisection and 
vivisection of some humans. He reluctantly 
chooses the latter alternative: 
I am where I am, not because I begin a 
monster and end up choosing the monstrous, 
but because I cannot think of anything at all 
compelling that cedes human life of any 
quality greater value than animal life of any 
quality.4 
Peter Singer has also argued that, given the 
appropriate circumstances, it may well be 
moral to use and kill nonhumans sm..d. humans 
who lack self-consciousness.5 
Those who reject both the exploitation of 
humans and the cessation of nonhuman 
exploitation must explain why mere 
"membership in the human species does and 
should have moral weight with us." In short, 
they must defend speciesjsm. The need for 
such a defense has become increasingly 
evident, as several recent attempts in this 
direction attest. I will argue that each of 
them fails. 
Speciesism pefined 
We must begin by distinguishing two 
versions of Speciesism: 
(1) Weak Speciesjsm: The according of
 
preferential treatment to a being, A,
 
because A is a member of species X.
 
(2) Strong Specjesjsm: The ascription of 
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b a s i c  m o r a l  r i g h t s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  r i g h t  t o  
l i f e ,  t o  a  b e i n g ,  A ,  b e c a u s e  A  i s  m e m b e r  o f  
s p e c i e s  X .  
C l e a r l y ,  ( 2 )  i m p l i e s  ( 1 ) ,  b u t  n o t  c o n v e r s e l y .  
A  b e i n g  m a y  b e  d u e  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a t m e n t  
o n  a c c o u n t  o f  s p e c i e s  m e m b e r s h i p  w i t h o u t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  h a v i n g  a  r i g h t  t o  l i f e .  F o r  
e x a m p . l e ,  i t  m i g h t  b e  a r g u e d  t h a t  a  h u m a n  
n o n p e r s o n  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  k i l l e d  t o  " h a r v e s t "  
i t s  t i s s u e  i f  a  n o n h u m a n  c o u l d  b e  u s e d  
i n s t e a d ,  b u t  t h a t  n o  r i g h t  t o  l i f e  w o u l d  b e  
v i o l a t e d  i f  w e  d o  k i l l  t h e  h u m a n  w h e n  n o  
n o n h u m a n  w o u l d  s e r v e  o u r  p u r p o s e s .  T h o s e  
w h o  i n s t e a d  b e l i e v e  t h a t  v i v i s e c t i n g  o r  
e a t i n g  h u m a n s  i s  a  v i o l a t i o n  o f  t h o s e  h u m a n s '  
r i g h t s ,  b u t  w h o  s e e  n o t h i n g  w r o n g  w i t h  
c o n t i n u i n g  t o  t h u s  u s e  n o n h u m a n s ,  n e e d  t o  
d e f e n d  w h a t  I  c a l l  s t r o n g  s p e c i e s i s m .  
T h e  m o s t  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  w a y  t o  j u s t i f y  
e i t h e r  v e r s i o n  o f  s p e c i e s i s m  w o u l d  b e  t o  
s h o w  t h a t  s p e c i e s  m e m b e r s h i p  c a n  b e  a  
m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ,  p e r h a p s  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  w e i g h t y  t o  w a r r a n t  t h e  
a s c r i p t i o n  o f  a  r i g h t  t o  l i f e .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  
h a n d ,  i t  m i g h t  b e  p o s s i b l e  t o  s h o w  t h a t  
p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a t m e n t  o r  t h e  a s c r i p t i o n  o f  a  
r i g h t  t o  l i f e  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  s p e c i e s  
m e m b e r s h i p  i s  j u s t i f i a b l e  e v e n  i f  s p e c i e s  
m e m b e r s h i p  i s  . n Q 1  a  m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c .  
s p e c i e s j s m  a n d  B i g o t r y  
H o w e v e r ,  i t  m i g h t  b e  t h o u g h t  t h a t  t h e  
a t t e m p t  t o  j u s t i f y  e i t h e r  v e r s i o n  o f  
s p e c i e s i s m  i s  d o o m e d  f r o m  t h e  s t a r t .  I t  h a s  
b e e n  c h a r g e d  t h a t  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a t m e n t  o n  
g r o u n d s  o f  s p e c i e s  i s  j u s t  a s  w r o n g  a s  
l e t t i n g  m o r a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  h i n g e  o n  r a c e  o r  
s e x .  I t  w o u l d  b e  v e r y  d i f f i c u l t  i n d e e d  t o  
j u s t i f y  b i g o t r y !  
S p e c i e s i s t s  f i n d  t h e  a n a l o g y  t o  r a c i s m  a n d  
s e x i s m  p o o r l y  b a s e d  a n d  o f f e n s i v e .  E .  g . ,  
M i c h a e l  A .  F o x  a r g u e s  t h a t  r a c i a l  m i n o r i t i e s  
a n d  w o m e n ,  a s  a u t o n o m o u s  b e i n g s ,  h a v e  
t h e i r  r i g h t s  v i o l a t e d  b y  r a c i s t s  a n d  s e x i s t s .  
B y  c o n t r a s t ,  F o x  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  n o n h u m a n  
a n i m a l s  l a c k  t h e  a u t o n o m y  r e q u i r e d  f o r  b a s i c  
r i g h t s .  T h u s ,  h e  f i n d s  t h e  a n a l o g y  b e t w e e n  
h u m a n  a n d  a n i m a l  e x p l o i t a t i o n  r i d i c u l o u s .  
6  
" F o r  r e a s o n s  o f  t h i s  s o r t , "  F o x  c l a i m s ,  
" s o m e  c r i t i c s  o f  a n i m a l  l i b e r a t i o n  h a v e  
d e n i e d  t h a t  s p e c i e s i s m  c o n s t i t u t e s  a  f o r m  o f  
i m m o r a l i t y  c o m p a r a b l e  t o  r a c i s m  a n d  
s e x i s m - - - i n d e e d ,  t h a t  i s  i m m o r a l  a t  a l l . " ?  
I  a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  c r i t i c s  t h a t  i t  w o u l d  b e  a  
m i s t a k e  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  t o  d i s m i s s  s p e c i e s i s m  
a s  y e t  a n o t h e r  f o r m  o f  b i g o t r y .  B u t  t h e i r  
r e a s o n s  f o r  r e j e c t i n g  t h e  a n a l o g y  w i t h  
r a c i s m  a n d  s e x i s m  q u i t e  m i s s  t h e  p o i n t .  
W i t h  t h e  p o s s i b l e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  w h a l e s  a n d  
d o l p h i n s ,  t h e r e  c e r t a i n l y  i s  a  l a r g e  g a p  
b e t w e e n  t h e  m e n t a l  c a p a c i t i e s  o f  n o r m a l  
a d u l t  h u m a n s  a n d  o t h e r  a n i m a l s .  B u t  t h j s  
s a m e  g a p  i s  p r e s e n t  b e t w e e n  t h e  a b i l i t j e s  o f  
n o r m a l  a d u l t  h u m a n s  a n d  v e r y  m e n t a l l y  
j m p a i r e d  h u m a n s .  T h o s e  w h o  a t t a c k  
s p e c i e s i s m  f o c u s  o n  o u r  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
t r e a t m e n t  o f  i m p a i r e d  h u m a n s  a n d  
n o n h u m a n s  w i t h  c o m p a r a b l e  o r  s u p e r i o r  
c a p a c i t i e s .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  r a c i s m ,  s e x i s m ,  
g m L s p e c i e s i s m ,  t w o  i n d i v i d u a l s  w h o  d o  n o t  
o t h e r w i s e  d i f f e r  i n  m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  
r e s p e c t s  m a y  b e  t r e a t e d  d i f f e r e n t i a l l y  
b e c a u s e  o f  t h e i r  r a c e ,  s e x ,  o r  s p e c i e s .  I n  
t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  t h e  v i e w s  a r e  e x a c t l y  
a n a l o g o u s .
S  
N o w ,  i t  i s  u n d e n i a b l y  t r u e  t h a t  r a c i s m  a n d  
s e x i s m  h a v e  n o t  b e e n  s h o w n  t o  b e  j u s t i f i e d .  
N o  o n e  h a s  s u c c e e d e d  i n  s h o w i n g  r a c e  o r  s e x  
t o  b e  a  m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ,  o r  
i n  s h o w i n g  h o w  p r e f e r e n c e  o n  t h e s e  g r o u n d s  
c o u l d  b e  j u s t i f i e d  e v e n  i f  r a c e  a n d  s e x  a r e  
n o t  m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  I t  
d o e s  n o t  f o l l o w ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  s p e c i e s i s m  
c a n n o t  b e  j u s t i f i e d .  S p e c i e s i s t s  w h o  w a n t  t o  
e s c a p e  t h e  c h a r g e  o f  b i g o t r y  m u s t  s h o w  t h a t  
t h e i r  v i e w  i s  d i f f e r e n t .  
A t t e m p t s  t o  S h o w  t h a t  S p e c i e s i s m  C a n  B e  a 
  
M o r a l l y  R e l e y a n t  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
  
I t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  a g r e e d  t h a t  p e r s o n h o o d  i s  
s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  m o r a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  a n d  b a s i c  
m o r a l  r i g h t s ,  i n c l U d i n g  a  r i g h t  t o  l i f e  
( u t i l i t a r i a n s  w h o  a r e  u n c o m f o r t a b l e  w i t h  
r i g h t s  t a l k  p r e f e r  t o  s p e a k  i n  t e r m s  o f  
" p r e s u m p t i o n s  a g a i n s t  k i l l i n g " ) .  
P h i l o s o p h e r s  d i f f e r  o n  t h e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  
p e r s o n h o o d :  s o m e  r e q u i r e  f u l l  a u t o n o m y  a n d  
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moral agency (e. g., Michael A. Fox), 9 some 
stipulate little more than self-consciousness 
and rudimentary agency (e. g., Joel 
Feinberg 10 and Peter Singer 11). 
Regardless of how liberally the criteria are 
specified, there are conscious humans (and 
some nonhumans) who fail to satisfy them. 
For the purposes of this paper, the strict 
interpretation of personhood, which requires 
moral agency, will be adopted. On this 
interpretation, most (perhaps all) nonhuman 
animals and a good number of humans do not 
qualify as persons. 
Recent defenders of speciesism have agreed 
that it is persons, primarily, who are 
rights-bearers. They have argued that 
nonpersons who are members of species that 
are characterized by personhood have basic 
moral rights as well. Belonging to a species 
of this kind, they believe, is a morally 
relevant characteristic. Let us now look at 
the arguments they have advanced to show 
this. 
a. The Appeal to Fairness 
Michael Wreen has written extensively on 
this subject of late. In his initial article, he 
set himself the task of establishing the 
following "strong speciesist" view: 
A live creature's belonging to a species, not 
necessarily our own, which is generally 
characterized by personhood, is of some 
moral weight, and enough, in fact, to ascribe 
a right to life to that creature. 12 
Briefly. Wreen argues that (1) there is a 
"quasi-metaphysical link" between 
personhood and humanity; (2) the laws of 
nature and chance have a bearing on whether 
a human will become or remain a person; (3) 
for the most part, human nonpersons are 
nonpersons through no fault of their own; 
and (4): 
Human nonpersons, then, should be ascribed 
basic rights; for although in the primary 
case it is persons who are ascribed basic 
rights, equality of opportunity, or, better, 
fairness, requires us to ascribe basic rights 
to human nonpersons as wel1. 13 
Wreen goes on to argue that the same would 
hold for a nonhuman belonging to a species 
characterized by personhood. 
I have recently criticized this defense of 
speciesism. 14 Wreen has replied;15 I have 
replied in turn;16 and he has just fired the 
last salvo. 17 My purpose here is not to 
rehash our lengthy debate. I simply want to 
spotlight the key claim in Wreen's argument 
for strong speciesism: the appeal to 
fairness. It is instructive to see why this 
seemingly plausible appeal must fail. 
Wreen believes that we owe human 
nonpersons whose condition is no fault of 
their own basic moral rights because it 
would be !.!!1fillr. to do otherwise. Those less 
fortunate than ourselves deserve 
compensation in the form of basic rights for 
their loss. I have pointed out that the 
fairness premise simply begs the question 
because it implies that human nonpersons 
already have a basic moral right: the right 
to be treated fairly.1 8 
Wreen has responded that he did not invoke 
fairness as a r.l.gb! in his argument for the 
basic rights of human nonpersons, but as a 
principle. That principle (unstated in his 
original article) is: 
[The Fairness Principle] All creatures in the 
relevant (person-related) class are to be 
treated fairly and equally in respect of 
personhood-generated-rights. 
Thus, he claims that his argument is not 
circular. 19 
I replied that his fairness principle would 
have no bearing on his argument unless "the 
relevant (person-related) class" included 
human nonpersons (those whose conditions 
are no fault of their own). Since the only 
relation between human persons and 
nonpersons is their common humanity, and 
since the human species is characterized by 
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p e r s o n h o o d ,  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  t h i s  
w a r r a n t s  t h e i r  i n c l u s i o n  i n  t h e  c l a s s  o f  
b e i n g s  d u e  r i g h t s  i s  q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g .  W r e e n  
m u s t  e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  m e m b e r s h i p  i n  a  s p e c i e s  
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  b y  p e r s o n h o o d  i s  m o r a l l y  
r e l e v a n t  a n d  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  t h e  a s c r i p t i o n  o f  
b a s i c  m o r a l  r i g h t s :  h e  c a n n o t  s i m p l y  a s s u m e  
t h i s  a s  a  p r e m i s e  i n  h i s  a r g u m e n t , 2 0  
W r e e n  h a s  n o w  r e s p o n d e d  t h a t  h e  d o e s  n o t  
a s s u m e  t h a t  h u m a n  n o n p e r s o n s  s h o u l d  b e  
i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  c l a s s  t o  w h o m  f a i r n e s s  
p r i n c i p l e  a p p l i e s :  h e  b e l i e v e s  h e  h a s  
e s t a b l i s h e d  t h i s  b y  a r g u m e n t .
2 1  
T h e  a p p e a l  
t o  f a i r n e s s ,  t h e n ,  i s  n o t  a n  a s s u m e d  
p r e m i s e :  w e  a r e  t o  c o n s t r u e  i t  a s  a n  
i n t e r m e d i a t e  c o n c l u s i o n .  T h e  a r g u m e n t  n o w  
l o o k s  l i k e  t h i s :  
1 .  A l l  c r e a t u r e s  i n  t h e  r e l e v a n t  ( p e r s o n ­
r e l a t e d )  c l a s s  a r e  t o  b e  t r e a t e d  f a i r l y  a n d  
e q u a l l y  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  p e r s o n h o o d - g e n e r a t e d  
r i g h t s .  
2 .  P e r s o n h o o d  " i s  m e t a p h y s i c a l l y  c a u g h t  u p  
w i t h  h u m a n i t y . "  
3 .  W h e t h e r  w e  b e c o m e  o r  r e m a i n  p e r s o n s  
d e p e n d s  o n  e m p i r i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  
4 .  F o r  t h e  m o s t  p a r t ,  h u m a n  n o n p e r s o n s  a r e  
t h a t  w a y  t h r o u g h  n o  f a u l t  o f  t h e i r  o w n .  
T h e r e f o r e :  H u m a n  n o n p e r s o n s  w h o s e  
c o n d i t i o n  i s  n o  f a u l t  o f  t h e i r  o w n  s h o u l d  b e  
i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  r e l e v a n t  ( p e r s o n - r e l a t e d )  
c l a s s ,  a l l  m e m b e r s  o f  w h i c h  a r e  t o  b e  
t r e a t e d  f a i r l y  a n d  e q u a l l y  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  
p e r s o n h o o d  g e n e r a t e d  r i g h t s .  
T h e r e f o r e :  ( I t  n o w  f o l l o w s  t r i v i a l l y  t h a t )  
h u m a n  n o n p e r s o n s  w h o s e  c o n d i t i o n  i s  n o  f a u l t  
o f  t h e i r  o w n  h a v e  b a s i c  m o r a l  r i g h t s .  
T h i s  m o v e  o n  W r e e n ' s  p a r t  f a i l s  t o  s a l v a g e  
t h e  a r g u m e n t .  T h e  p r e m i s e s  a s  s t a t e d  d o  n o t  
y i e l d  t h e  i n t e r m e d i a t e  c o n c l u s i o n  a t  a l l .  T h e  
" F a i r n e s s  P r i n c i p l e "  ( p r e m i s e  1 )  i m p l i e s  
n o t h i n g  a b o u t  t h e  s o r t s  o f  b e i n g s  t o  b e  
i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  ' r e l e v a n t  ( p e r s o n - r e l a t e d )  
c l a s s . '  T h e  h i g h l y  d u b i o u s  " m e t a p h y s i c a l "  
c l a i m  ( p r e m i s e  2 )  a l s o  d o e s n ' t  s h o W  t h a t  a . l l  
h u m a n s  a r e - - - l i k e  p e r s o n s - - - t h e  s o r t s  o f  
b e i n g s  w h o  a r e  d u e  b a s i c  m o r a l  r i g h t s ,  a s  
W r e e n  a d m i t s .
2 2  
T h e  e m p i r i c a l  c l a i m  
( p r e m i s e s  3  a n d  4 )  c a n  h a v e  n o  n o r m a t i v e  
i m p l i c a t i o n s .  T h e  c o n j u c t i o n  o f  ( 1  ) - ( 4 )  i s  
s i m p l y  i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  
i n t e r m e d i a t e  c o n c l u s i o n .  I n  o r d e r  t o  b e  
v a l i d ,  t h e  a r g u m e n t  m u s t  b e  a n  e n t h y m e m e .  
A n o t h e r  n o r m a t i v e  p r e m i s e  m u s t  b e  a d d e d ,  
s a y i n g ·  s o m t h i n g  l i k e  t h i s :  " I t  w o u l d  b e  
u n f a i r  t o  d e n y  p e r s o n h o o d - g e n e r a t e d  r i g h t s  
t o  t h o s e  h u m a n s  w h o  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  
p e r s o n s  h a d  c o n d i t i o n s  n o t  o b t a i n e d  w h i c h  
w e r e  b e y o n d  t h e i r  c o n t r o l . "  B u t  t h i s  w o u l d  
b e  t o  a s s u m e  t h a t  t h e s e  h u m a n  n o n p e r s o n s  
a r e  a l r e a d y  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  c l a s s  t o  w h i c h  t h e  
f a i r n e s s  p r i n c i p l e  a p p l i e s :  t h e  v e r y  
( i n t e r m e d i a t e )  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  t h e  a r g u m e n t .  
I f  w e  l e a v e  a n y  s u c h  p r e m i s e s  o u t ,  t h e  
c o n c l u s i o n  w i l l  n o t  f o l l o w ;  i f  w e  l e a v e  i t  i n ,  
a n d  d o  n o t  s u p p o r t  i t  b y  f u r t h e r  a r g u m e n t , '  i t  
s i m p l y  b e g s  t h e  q u e s t i o n .  W e  m u s t  g o  
b e y o n d  a n  a p p e a l  t o  f a i r n e s s  i f  s p e c i e s i s m  i s  
t o  b e  j u s t i f i e d .  
b .  T h e  Ar(~ument f r o m  T h w a r t e d  p o t e n t i a l  
I  w a n t  t o  s u g g e s t  a n  a r g u m e n t  h e r e  w h i c h  
d o e s  t r y  t o  g o  b e y o n d  a n  a p p e a l  t o  f a i r n e s s .  
I t  i s  i n  t h e  s p i r i t ,  i f  n o t  t h e  l e t t e r ,  o f  
W r e e n ' s  d e f e n s e  o f  s t r o n g  s p e c i e s i s m .  
S u p p o s e  o n e  h o l d s  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  p e r s o n h o o d ,  
w h i l e  s u f f i c i e n ! ,  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  m o r a l  
c o n s i d e r a b i l i t y .  O n e  m i g h t  h o l d  t h a t  
p o t e n t i a l  p e r s o n h o o d  i s  a  m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  w h i c h  m a k e s  a  b e i n g  m o r a l l y  
c o n s i d e r a b l e .  V e r y  s m a l l  c h i l d r e n ,  f o r  
e x a m p l e ,  a r e  n o t  y e t  p e r s o n s  b u t  m a y  b e  
h e l d  t o  b e  m o r a l l y  c o n s i d e r a b l e  b e c a u s e  t h e y  
a r e  p o t e n t i a l  p e r s o n s .  N o w ,  i t  c a n  b e  
a r g u e d ,  v e r y  m e n t a l l y  d e f i c i e n t  h u m a n s  
( a s s u m i n g  t h a t  t h e i r  c o n d i t i o n  i s  n o  f a u l t  o f  
t h e i r  o w n )  a r e  i n n o c e n t  b e i n g s  w h o  h a v e  
b e e n  d e p r i v e d  n o t  m e r e l y  o f  a c t u a l  
p e r s o n h o o d  ( w h i c h  h o l d s  i n  s o m e  c a s e s  
o n l y ) ,  . b u t  o f  a n y  p o t e n t i a l  p e r s o n h o o d .  T h e i r  
p o t e n t i a l  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d  h a s  b e e n  t h w a r t e d .  
I f  p o t e n t i a l  p e r s o n h o o d  h a s  m o r a l  w e i g h t ,  i t  
c a n  b e  a r g u e d ,  w h y  s h o u l d n ' t  t h e  l . 2 n  o f  
p o t e n t i a l  p e r s o n h o o d  c o u n t  a s  w e l l ?  T h e  
c h i l d  w i l l  b e  a  p e r s o n ;  t h e  s e v e r e l y  r e t a r d e d  
h u m a n  w o  u I d  h a v e  b e e n  a  p e r s o n  i f  
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misfortune had not struck. This, one might 
hold, is the morally relevant difference 
between a mentally handicapped human and, 
e.g., a dog. If so, differential treatment of 
the two would be justified. 
Many would reject this argument because it 
assigns moral weight to potentiality. 
Suppose the objections to this could be 
overcome, however (as I am inclined to 
believe they could be). Would we now have a 
good argument for speciesism? 
It is certainly reasonable to say that 
potential personhood depends upon the 
characteristics of one's species. But how 
much moral weight should be assigned to 
potential personhood? We must answer this 
question before we can try to determine how 
much the loss of that potential should count. 
We can hold one of two views: the strict 
potentiality view or the gradualist 
potentiality view. 23 The first view assigns 
full moral status to potential persons. Since 
it implies that a fertilized ovum has all the 
basic moral rights possessed by a person, 
the strict view is often rejected as 
extremely implausible. However, those who 
retreat to the gradualist view will find that 
it cannot be used to support strong 
speciesism. 
According to gradualism, potential persons 
are all morally considerable, but their moral 
significance increases as that potential is 
actualized. The nearer one is to being a 
person, the greater is one's moral 
significance. One does not achieve maximum 
significance---i. e., one does not gain basic 
moral rights---until actual personhood is 
achieved. Until then, one has· at most a 
strong claim to life, a claim whose strength 
increases as one comes closer to being a 
person. What moral weight could thwarted 
potential have on such a view? Does one's 
degree of moral significance increase 
depending on how close to personhood one 
was when misfortune struck? Does a human 
damaged as a three-month-old fetus count 
for less than a child who became brain­
damaged after birth? At what point, if any, 
does a victim of thwarted potential gain a 
right to life? Perhaps only if he or she had 
achieved personhood, then tragically lost it? 
We could not very well hold that those who 
had not yet achieved personhood when their 
potential was thwarted have a right to life 
when ~ persons with the same 
characteristics who soon will ~ persons 
lack that right. 
Gradualism simply does not provide the 
theoretical underpinning needed for the view 
that unfortunate human nonpersons all have a 
right to life. Thus, it does not support 
strong speciesism. It could be used to 
support weak speciesism because it would 
warrant differential treatment of human 
nonpersons deprived of their personhood and 
nonhumans who never could have been 
persons. But all this would mean is that we 
should sacrifice the nonhuman to benefit a 
person before sacrificing the human. It 
would also imply that the human nonperson 
who was afflicted as a three-month-old 
fetus should be used before one afflicted at 
sixteen weeks of gestation. 
Considerations of this sort drive us back to 
the strict potentiality view. At least it 
accords a full right to life to any potential 
person. By extension, one could accord this 
right to any victim of thwarted potential, 
regardless of the point at which the 
deprivation occurred. Wouldn't such a view 
give good support to strong speciesism? 
It would not. Even supposing the 
implausability of the strict view could be 
overcome, it can at most allow the 
ascription of a right to life to a nonperson 
who once was a potential person. Those who 
were conceived without that potential have 
no such potential to thwart. One cannot be 
robbed of what one has never possessed. 
(The same implication holds for the 
gradualist position: those who never had 
potential for personhood would not even have 
a weak claim to life.) 
Imagine three individuals. All have 
comparable mental abilities and all are 
nonpersons. One is a nonperson because his 
mother was injured when he was a six­
month-old fetus. Another was conceived 
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w i t h  a  g e n e t i c  m a k e u p  w h i c h  m a k e s  i t  
i m p o s s i b l e  f o r  h e r  t o  b e c o m e  a  p e r s o n .  T h e  
t h i r d  i s  a  n o n h u m a n  a n i m a l  w h o  i s  a  t y p i c a l  
m e m b e r  o f  h e r  s p e c i e s .  O f  c o u r s e ,  n o n e  o f  
t h e m  h a s  c h o s e n  t o  b e  a  n o n p e r s o n .  N o w  
s u p p o s e  t h a t  w e  c o u l d  s a v e  t h e  l i f e  o f  a  
p e r s o n  b y  k i l l i n g  a n y o n e  o f  t h e s e  t h r e e .  T h e  
s t r i c t  i n t e  r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  t h w a r t e d  
p o t e n t i a l  v i e w  w o u l d  r e q u i r e  u s  t o  s p a r e  t h e  
a c c i d e n t  v i c t i m  a n d  t o  s a c r i f i c e  e i t h e r  t h e  
r e m a i n i n g  h u m a n  o r  t h e  a n i m a l .  N e i t h e r  o f  
t h e  l a t t e r  t w o  h a s  a  r i g h t  t o  l i f e  o n  t h i s  
v i e w ,  b e c a u s e ,  u n l i k e  t h e  f i r s t  h u m a n ,  t h e y  
n e v e r  w e r e  p o t e n t i a l  p e r s o n s .  
W h y  d o  w e  f i n d  t h i s  c o n s e q u e n c e  s o  m o r a l l y  
u n a c c e p t a b l e ?  t  t h i n k  t h a t  r e f l e c t i o n  o n  t h i s  
m a t t e r  w i l l  l e a d  u s  e v e n  f u r t h e r  f r o m  
s p e c i e s i s m .  I t  s e e m s  w r o n g  t o  s p a r e  t h e  
h u m a n  w h o  w a s  v i c t i m i z e d  w h e n  a  s i x -
m o n t h - o l d  f e t u s  w h i l e  w e  c o n d e m n  t h e  h u m a n  
w h o  w a s  c o n c e i v e d  w i t h o u t  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  
p e r s o n h o o d ,  b e c a u s e  b o t h  a r e  e s s e n t i a l l y  
i n n o c e n t .  N e i t h e r  h a d  a n y  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  r e s u l t i n g  i n  t h e i r  c o n d i t i o n s . .  
W h e t h e r  t h e  d i e  w a s  c a s t  a t  c o n c e p t i o n  o r  
a f t e r  h a r d l y  s e e m s  m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t .  B . ! ! 1  
t h i s  a l s o  h o l d s  f o r  t h e  a n i m a l .  H e r  
p e r m a n e n t  n o n p e r s o n h o o d  i s  j u s t  a s  
g e n e t i c a l l y  d e t e r m i n e d  a s  t h e  s e c o n d  
h u m a n ' s .  I f  t h e  t w o  h u m a n s  s e e m  t o  b e  o n  a  
m o r a l  p a r ,  s h o u l d n ' t  t h e  a n i m a l  s h a r e  t h e i r  
s t a t u s ?  
I t  i s  t e m p t i n g  t o  r e p l y  a s  f o l l o w s :  " W e  h a v e  
b e e n  i n t e r p r e t i n g  ' p o t e n t i a l '  t o o  n a r r o w l y .  
T h e  h u m a n  w h o  w a s  c o n c e i v e d  w i t h o u t  t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  f o r  p e r s o n h o o d  s u f f e r s  f r o m  a  
g e n e t i c  a b n o r m a l i t y .  T h e r e  i s  a  " s p e c i e s  
p o t e n t i a l "  i n  w h i c h  s h e  c a n n o t  s h a r e ,  t h r o u g h  
n o  f a u l t  o f  h e r  o w n .  B y  c o n t r a s t ,  a l t h o u g h  
t h e  a n i m a l  a l s o  d i d  n o t  c h o o s e  
n o n p e r s o n h o o d ,  s h e  w a s  d e a l t  a  f u l l  h a n d  a t  
c o n c e p t i o n .  T h i s  i s  t h e  m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  
d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o .  T h u s ,  
s p e c i e s i s m  i s  j u s t i f i e d .  T h e  a n i m a l  s h o u l d  
d i e ;  n o t  t h e  h u m a n . "  
T e m p t i n g  t h o u g h  t h i s  l i n e  o f  a r g u m e n t  m a y  
b e ,  w e  c a n n o t  u s e  i t  t o  s u p p o r t  s p e c i e s i s m ,  
f o r  i t  a s s u m e s  t h e  v e r y  p o i n t  a t  i s s u e .  
A c c o r d i n g  t o  s p e c i e s i s m ,  m e m b e r s h i p  i n  a  
s p e c i e s  w h e r e  p e r s o n h o o d  i s  t h e  n o r m  i s  
m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t .  W e  c a n n o t  e s t a b l i s h  t h i s  
c o n c l u s i o n  b y  a s s e r t i n g  t h a t  n o n p e r s o n s  
b e l o n g i n g  t o  s p e c i e s  w h e r e  p e r s o n h o o d  i s  t h e  
n o r m  a r e  t h e r e b y  m o r e  m o r a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  
t h a n  n o n p e r s o n s  w h o  a r e  i n  t h e  n o r m a l  r a n g e  
f o r  t h e i r  s p e c i e s .  T h i s  a r g u m e n t  i s  p l a i n l y  
c i r c u l a r .  
T h u s ,  h o w e v e r  i t  i s  i n t e r p r e t e d ,  t h e  
t h w a r t e d  p o t e n t i a l  a r g u m e n t  f a i l s  t o  s u p p o r t  
a n y  s p e c i e s i s t  c o n c l u s i o n s .  
c .  T h e  A~~eal t o  B e n e y o l e n c e  
I t  w i l l  n o w  b e  f a i r l y  e a s y  t o  s h o w  w h y  
a p p e a l s  s u c h  a s  M .  A .  F o x  m a k e s  t o  " c h a r i t y ,  
b e n e v o l e n c e ,  [ a n d ]  h u m a n e n e s s " 2 4  a l s o  d o  
n o t  s u p p o r t  s p e c i e s i s m .  S u p p o s e  o n e  h o l d s  
t h a t  ( 1 )  ~rima f a c i e ,  o n l y  p e r s o n s  a r e  
m o r a l l y  c o n s i d e r a b l e , ·  b u t  t h a t  ( 2 )  
n o n p e r s o n s  w h o  b e l o n g  t o  s p e c i e s  
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  b y  p e r s o n s  a l s o  c a n  b e  s h o w n  
t o  b e  m o r a l l y  c o n s i d e r a b l e .  O n e  c o u l d  n o t  
a r g u e  t h a t  b e n e v o l e n c e ,  e t c . ,  r e q u i r e s  o n e  t o  
i n c l u d e  t h e s e  n o n p e r s o n s  i n  t h e  c l a s s  o f  
m o r a l l y  c o n s i d e r a b l e  b e i n g s .  S u c h  a n  
a r g u m e n t  w o u l d  b e  c i r c u l a r  i n  t h e  s a m e  w a s  
t h e  a p p e a l  t o  f a i r n e s s  i s :  w e  c a n  o n l y  b e  
b e n e v o l e n t  o r  c h a r i t a b l e  t o  t h o s e  w h o  
a l r e a d y  a r e  m o r a l l y  c o n s i d e r a b l e  ( a s  
o p p o s e d  t o  t h i n g s  l i k e  v i d e o  c a s s e t t e  
r e c o r d e r s ) .  T h e y  m u s t  b e  s u i t a b l e  o b j e c t s  
o f  m o r a l  c o n c e r n  i n  o r d e r  f o r  u s  t o  k i n d  t o  
t h e m .  
O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  i f  o n e  h o l d s  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  
( 1 )  ~rima f a c i e ,  o n l y  p e r s o n s  h a v e  a  r i g h t  t o  
. l . i . W . ,  ( 2 )  s e n t i e n t  n o n p e r s o n s  a r e  m o r a l l y  
c o n s i d e r a b l e ,  a n d  ( 3 )  t h o s e  s e n t i e n t  
n o n p e r s o n s  w h o  b e l o n g  t o  s p e c i e s  
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  b y  p e r s o n h o o d  s h o u l d  a l s o  
h a v e  a  r i g h t  t o  l i f e ,  o n e  w i l l  s t i l l  r u n  i n t o  
d i f f i c u l t i e s .  F o r  w h y  s h o u l d  b e n e v o l e n c e  
f a v o r  o n e  g r o u p  o f  m o r a l l y  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
n o n p e r s o n s  ( e .  g . ,  i m p a i r e d  h u m a n s )  o v e r  
a n o t h e r ?  T h i ' s  m u s t  b e  s h o w n ,  n o t  m e r e l y  
a s s e r t e d .  I t  c a n n o t  b e  s h o w n  b y  p o i n t i n g  o u t  
t h a t  h u m a n  n o n p e r s o n s  a r e  " l e s s  f o r t u n a t e  
t h a n  o u r s e l v e s " :  2 5  t h i s  e i t h e r  c o l l a p s e s  
i n t o  a n  i l l i c i t  a p p e a l  t o  f a i r n e s s  ( " t h e y  d o n ' t  
d e s e r v e  s u c h  t r e a t m e n t " )  o r  t h w a r t e d  
p o t e n t i a l  ( " u n l i k e  u s ,  t h e y  w e r e  r o b b e d  o f  
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their potential personhood"). We must move 
beyond benevolence if we are to show that 
species membership can make a moral 
difference. 
d. Appeals to Kinship and Closeness 
Fox puts the next move this way: 
Just as our untutored moral sense tells us 
that we have very strong obligations to 
members of our immediate families, so it 
seems that preferential treatment should, 
under certain circumstances, accordingly be 
granted to members of the human family.26 
Mary Midgely makes the same suggestion, 
claiming that no case has been made for the 
moral irrelevance of kinship, "nor denying 
that closeness imposes special duties."27 If 
our kinship to one of two otherwise 
relevantly similar beings does indeed 
constitute a morally relevant difference 
between the two, the argument goes, we are 
justified rather than bigoted when we prefer 
one over the other. 
A kernel of truth is buried in this argument, 
but careful examination will show that this 
attempt to justify speciesism collapses. At 
the core of the argument is an analogy 
between our obligations to our "kin" and our 
obligations to mentally impaired humans. 
But how are we to interpret kinship here? 
The kind of kinship most relevant to 
speciesism is genetic relatedness. But is it 
true to say that we have obligations to 
certain beings because they are genetically 
related to us? That such beings should be 
preferred to others? If we believed this, we 
would think it right to prefer the "natural" 
parent or child to the adoptive parent or 
child, or to prefer the sibling to the spouse. 
Surely this is nonsense. (Of course, there 
are people who believe this, just as there 
are people who think that members of their 
own race should come first, but it is difficult 
in the extreme to imagine how such beliefs 
could be morally justified.) There is no 
room in this model for the strong obligations 
we believe we have to our closest friends 
and, especially, to our mates. We may feel 
"akin" to them, but they are usually not 
particularly close to us in genetic terms. 
Thus, kinship must be interpreted less 
narrowly if there is any plausibility to the 
claim that it imposes special obligations. 
Abandoning the genetic interpretation 
already weakens the analogy to speciesism. 
The analogy is even more seriously 
undermined by a closer look at the special 
obligations we believe we have to those 
close to us. 
Although it has been charged that 
preferential treatment of spouses, children 
("natural" or adopted), and friends is pure 
prejudice, a good case can be made for 
special obligations in these matters. Rawls' 
distinction between aCQuired and unacQuired 
or "natural" duties will serve us here.28 
Our duties to respect the basic rights of 
others are .l!O.acquired, but other duties are 
acquired as a result of our voluntary actions 
or the voluntary actions of others. Tom 
Regan has plausibly argued that our close 
relationships impose acquired obligations.29 
This does not imply, however, that we 
should prefer our loved ones in all 
circumstances to others or that we are 
entitled to violate the basic rights of others 
for our loved ones' sakes. E. g., you would 
not be obligated to use your limited funds to 
shelter and educate your child rather than 
the neighbor's, but you would be entitled to 
steal from your neighbor to give your child a 
better education. Now suppose that the 
neighbor's child and your own are both 
drowning, that you are the only one in a 
position to help, and that you know you will 
only be able to save one of them. Since you 
owe your child special protection, you should 
save her rather than the unfortunate other 
child. You would D..Q1 be entitled to .Is.ill the 
other child (e. g., by dumping him out of 
lifeboat) to save yours, however. Now let 
us see what these considerations do to the 
kinship argument. 
First of all, those who believe that Jlll,rn..a, 
facie only persons are morally considerable,.! 
but that nonpersons belonging to personhood-I 
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c h a r a c t e r i z e d  s p e c i e s  c a n  b e  s h o w n  t o  b e  
m o r a l l y  c o n s i d e r a b l e  a s  w e l l ,  c a n n o t  u s e  t h e  
k i n s h i p  a n a l o g y  t o  m a k e  t h e i r  c a s e .  
C l o s e n e s s  w a r r a n t s  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a t m e n t  
o f  o n e  b e i n g  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  a n o t h e r  b e c a u s e  
w e  h a v e  a c q u j r e d  d u t i e s  t o  o n e  a n d  n o t  t h e  
o t h e r .  T h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  b e i n g  t o  w h o m  
w e  a r e  c l o s e  i s  a  I r e  a  d  y  m o r a l l y  
c o n s i d e r a b l e ;  o t h e r w i s e ,  w e  c o u l d  h a v e  l l . Q  
d u t i e s  t o  t h a t  b e i n g .  C l o s e n e s s  c a n  b e  u s e d  
t o  j u s t i f y  t h e  f a v o r i n g  o f  o n e  m o r a l l y  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  b e i n g  o v e r  a n o t h e r ,  w i t h o u t  
v i o l a t i n g  t h e  o t h e r ' s  b a s i c  r i g h t s ,  b u t  i t  
c a n n o t  b e  u s e d  t o  a c e  0  r  d  m o r a l  
c o n s i d e r a b i l i t y  t o  a n y  b e i n g .  
S p e c i e s i s t s  w h o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  m o r a l  
c o n s i d e r a b i l i t y  i s  n o t  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  p e r s o n s  
w o u l d  s e e m  t o  b e  i n  a  b e t t e r  p o s i t i o n  t o  m a k e  
u s e  o f  t h e  k i n s h i p  a n a l o g y ,  b u t  t h i s  i s  n o t  t h e  
c a s e .  T y p i c a l l y ,  t h e s e  s p e c i e s i s t s  h o l d  t h a t  
p r i m a  f a c i e  o n l y  p e r s o n s  h a v e  a  r i g h t  t o  l i f e ,  
b u t  t h a t  s e n t i e n t  n o n p e r s o n s  a r e  m o r a l l y  
c o n s i d e r a b l e ,  a n d  c a n  b e  s h o w n  t o  h a v e  a  
r i g h t  t o  l i f e  i f  t h e y  b e l o n g  t o  s p e c i e s  i n  
w h i c h  p e r s o n h o o d  i s  t h e  n o r m .  B u t  u n l e s s  
w e  h a v e  e n t e r e d  i n t o  c l o s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
w i t h  h u m a n s  w h o  a r e  o r  h a v e  b e c o m e  
n o n p e r s o n s ,  o u r  d u t i e s  t o  t h e m  a r e  
l i l l a c q u i r e d .  A n y  s u c h  d u t i e s  ( e .  g . ,  t h e  d u t y  
n o t  t o  t o r t u r e  t h e m )  w o u l d  h a v e  t o  b e  
c o m m e n s u r a t e  w i t h  t h e i r  d e g r e e  o f  m o r a l  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  a n d  c o u l d  n o t  a l r e a d y  i n c l u d e  a  
r i g h t  t o  l i f e  (  b y  h y p o t h e s i s ) .  B y  t h e  s a m e  
t o k e n ,  w e  w o u l d  h a v e  t h e s e  u n a c q u i r e d  
d u t i e s  t o  m o r a l l y  c o n s i d e r a b l e  n o n h u m a n  
n o n p e r s o n s .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  i f  o n e  d i d  
h a v e  a c q u i r e d  d u t i e s  t o  h u m a n  n o n p e r s o n s ,  i t  
i s  e x t r e m e l y  d o u b t f u l  t h a t  t h e s e  c o u l d  
i n c l u d e  a  r i g h t  t o  l i f e .  W e  c o n s t r u e  o u r  
o b l i g a t i o n  t o  r e s p e c t  o t h e r s '  r i g h t s  t o  l i f e  a s  
a  " n a t u r a l "  o r  J m . a c q u i r e d  d u t y .  T h u s ,  t h e  
a c q u i r e d  o b l i g a t i o n s  s t e m m i n g  f r o m  c l o s e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  c a n n o t  b e  u s e d  t o  s h o w  w h y  
n o n p e r s o n s  w h o  b e l o n g  t o  p e r s o n h o o d ­
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  s p e c i e s  s u c h  a s  h u m a n i t y  m u s t  
h a v e  a  r i g h t  t o  l i f e .  
S p e c i e s i s t s  w h o  r e m a i n  i n t r i g u e d  b y  t h e  
k i n s h i p  a n a l o g y  c a n n o t  n o w  f a l l  b a c k  o n  o u r  
g r e a t e r  b i o l o g i c a l  k i n s h i p  t o  h u m a n  
n o n p e r s o n s  t o  t r y  t o  j u s t i f y  p r e f e r e n t i a l  
t r e a t m e n t  o f  t h e m .  T h a t  m o v e  h a s  a l r e a d y  
b e e n  d i s c r e d i t e d .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  r e p l y  ~ o p e n  t o  t h e m :  " W e  m a y  
h a v e  n o  c l o s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  a n y  h u m a n  
n o n p e r s o n s ,  b u t  w e  a r e  s t i l l  e m o t i o n a l l y  
b o u n d  t o  t h e m .  W h i l e  w e  d o  n o t  o b j e c t  t o  
u s i n g  c e r t a i n  a n i m a l s  f o r  f o o d  a n d  r e s e a r c h  
p u r p o s e s ,  w e  c a n n o t  s t o m a c h  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  
d o i n g  t h e  s a m e  t o  d e f e c t i v e  h u m a n s .  E v e n  i f  
t h e y  h a v e  n o  r i g h t  t o  I i f e - - - e v e n  i f ,  
t e c h n i c a l l y ,  t h e y  a r e  n o t  e v e n  m o r a l l y  
c o n s i d e r a b l e - - - o u r  f e e l i n g s  w i l l  n o t  p e r m i t  
u s  t o  t r e a t  t h e m  i n  t h e s e  w a y s .  T h i s  i s  w h a t  
m a k e s ,  a n d  s h o u l d  m a k e ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e . "  
F o x  s u g g e s t s  t h i s  r e p l y  h i m s e l f  w h e n  h e  
c l a i m s  t h a t  " n a t u r a l  e m o t i o n a l  r e s p o n s e s "  
s h o u l d  h a v e  w e i g h t  i n  o u r  m o r a l  j u d g m e n t s  
a b o u t  h u m a n s  w h o  a r e  n o n p e r s o n s .
3 D  
T h o s e  w h o  w o u l d  a r g u e  t h i s  w a y  a r e  n o  
l o n g e r  a r g u i n g  t h a t  s p e c i e s  m e m b e r s h i p  c a n  
w a r r a n t  m o r a l  c o n s i d e r a b i l i t y  o r  a  r i g h t  t o  
l i f e .  T h a t  i s  j u s t  a s  w e l l :  a l l  s u c h  a t t e m p t s  
h a v e  s o  f a r  f a i l e d .  T h e  e m p h a s i s  i s  n o w  
p l a c e d  o n  t h e  e m o t i o n a l  a t t a c h m e n t  o n e  f e e l s  
t o  c e r t a i n  b e i n g s  r a t h e r  t h a n  o n  t h e  m o r a l l y  
r e l e v a n t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h e s e  b e i n g s  m i g h t  
h a v e .  I n s t e a d  o f  a r g u i n g  " w e  p r e f e r  
i n d i v i d u a l  x  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  y  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  r i g h t  
t o  d o  s o , "  o n e  i s  c l a i m i n g  " o u r  p r e f e r r i n g  x  
t o  y  m a k e s  i t  r i g h t  t o  d o  s o . "  L e t  u s  n o w  
c o n s i d e r  t h i s  v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  k i n d  o f  a t t e m p t  
t o  j u s t i f y  s p e c i e s i s m .  
A t t e m p t s  t o  S h o w  s p e c i e s j s m  i s  J u s t i f i e d 
  
E y e n  i f  S p e c i e s  i s  n o t  a  M o r a l l Y  R e l e y a n t 
  
C h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
  
a .  T h e  A p p e a l  t o  E m o t i o n s  
T h i s  i s  t h e  a r g u m e n t  j u s t  s t a t e d  a b o v e .  A s  
i t  s t a n d s ,  i t  w i l l  n o t  d o  a t  a l l .  T h e  l i v e s  a n d  
w e l l - b e i n g  o f  n o n p e r s o n s ,  h u m a n  a n d  
n o n h u m a n ,  a r e  s a i d  t o  b e  c o n t i n g e n t  o n  t h e  
e m o t i o n a l  t i e s  o n e  m a y  n o t  h a v e  t o  t h e s e  
b e i n g s .  T h e  m o s t  o b v i o u s  k i n d s  o f  p r e j u d i c e  
a r e  s a n c t i o n e d '  b y  s u c h  a  v i e w .  E .  g . ,  m a n y  
p e o p l e  w h o  h a p p i l y  c o n s u m e  p o r k  c h o p s  
w o u l d  r a t h e r  s t a r v e  t h a n  e a t  a  b e a g l e ;  s o m e  
w h o  a r e  h o r r i f i e d  b y  t h e  a g o n y  o f  r a b b i t s  
u s e d  f o r  c o s m e t i c s  t e s t i n g  w o u l d  b e  
u n c o n c e r n e d  i f  t h e  r o d e n t s  i n v o l v e d  w e r e  
r a t s ;  a n d  m a n y  w h o  w o u l d  n e v e r  w e a r  a  c o a t  
9 1  
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fashioned from skinned Persian cats wear 
snakeskin shoes or belts (the snakes are 
skinned alive and generally take several 
days to die). Far more disturbing to the 
speciesist is the fact that many people have 
much stronger emotional ties to their pets 
than to mentally impaired humans. Fox 
indignantly reports the true story of a man 
in a small lifeboat who refused to throw his 
dog overboard to make room for two 
31drowning men. If those two men had been 
nonpersons (and thus lacking in basic rights 
according to Fox's "autonomy" view), the 
argument from emotional attachment would 
tell us that the man in the lifeboat acted 
correctly. 
Similar problems arise when the appeal to 
emotion is generalized. Most persons, it is 
often argued, would be so upset by the 
practice of treating human nonpersons as 
harvestable "natural resources" that the 
resultant "side-effects" of the practice 
would constitute a net loss in utility. This 
appeal to aggregate emotions also fails, as I 
have argued elsewhere.32 Emotions, 
including those based on prudence, simply 
cannot be relied upon to provide the results 
speciesists desire. 
b. Appeals to Rational Preferences 
One way for a speciesist to try to avoid such 
problems is to appeal to rat ion a I 
preferences. One could argue that well­
informed, clearly thinking persons would not 
sanction the "harvesting" of nonpersons 
belonging to their own species, but would 
have no aversion to the "humane" use of 
others allegedly lacking in basic moral 
rights. This is exactly what Thomas Young 
has recently argued.33 He thinks that we 
have a tendency (probably innate) to prefer 
members of our species, even if they lack 
moral considerability.34 He argues that 
such preference is rational, according to a 
very plausible theory of rational preference 
advanced by Richard B. Brandt.35 
According to Brandt, irrational preferences 
are preferences, had by an individual, which 
would be extinguished by that individual's 
repeated, vivid reflection on relevant 
information, including logic. Any preference 
which would not be extinguished by such a 
procedure is rational, according to 
Brandt.36 Young believes that no amount of 
logic and informed, vivid reflection will 
alter one's preference for members of one's 
own species. Thus, on the Young-Brandt 
view, "rational" persons are speciesists. 
Young uses this line of argument to support 
an "ideal" version of the side-effects 
argument for speciesism: if only rational 
preferences are counted, the side-effects of 
harvesting human nonpersons would create 
massive disutility compared to the humane 
37disposal of animal nonpersons. However, 
others who prefer not to argue along 
utilitarian lines can also appeal to rational 
preferences. Even Mary Midgely, who 
claims that rationality has been emphasized 
at the expense of emotions in moral 
theorizing, could adopt the Brandt view. She 
claims that preferences for one's own 
species is due "considerable respect" 
because it is a "natural, emotional 
preference. "38 Although she characterizes 
this preference as emotional "rather than" 
rational,39 it ~ be rational in Brandt's 
sense if reflection would not extinguish it. 
What better justification could speciesism 
have than a demonstration of its rationality? 
Despite its potentially broad appeal, 
however, this attempt to justify speciesism 
fails. That is because, on Brandt's view, it 
is impossible to distinguish rationality from 
extreme bigotry. Brandi himself points out 
that his view has a "surprising" implication: 
preference and aversions which are so 
firmly engrained that they would be 
extinguished by no amount of vivid, 
informed, logical reflection on the part of 
the individual who has them are classified as 
"rational."40 Unfortunately, as we know, 
die-hard bigots are notoriously undisturbed 
by facts and logic. They are unmoved by 
considerations that change other minds. We 
have always considered views which are 
immune to rational persuasion lrrational, but 




o n  B r a n d t ' s  v i e w  t h e  o p p o s i t e  i s  t h e  c a s e .  
T h u s ,  t h e  W r a t i o n a l  p r e f e r e n c e
w  
l i n e  o f  
a r g u m e n t  w o u l d  W j u s t i f y w  deep-seat~d 
r a c i a l ,  s e x u a l ,  o r  c u l t u r a l  p r e j u d i c e .  T h e  
h u m a n  t e n d e n c y  t o  p r e f e r  t h o s e  m o s t  s i m i l a r  
t o  o n e s e l f  o f t e n  t a k e s  s u c h  f o r m s .  M i d g e l y  
n o t e s  t h a t  t h i s  i s  t h e  c a s e ,  b u t  d i s m i s s e s  i t  
a s  m e r e  w p s e u d o - s p e c i a t i o n ; w  L e . ,  a s  t h e  
c o n f u s i o n  o f  r a c e ,  c u l t u r e ,  e t c . ,  w i t h  
s p e c i e s .
4 1  
T h i s  r e p l y  c o u l d  n o t  b e  u s e d  t o  
d i s t i n g u i s h  s p e c i e s i s m  f r o m  t h e  a b o v e  f o r m s  
o f  b i g o t r y ,  h o w e v e r ,  s i n c e  i t  w o u l d  c l e a r l y  
b e g  t h e  q u e s t i o n .  T h e  v e r y  t e r m  ' p s e u d o ­
s p e c i a t i o n '  i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  i m p l i e s  t h a t  
p r e f e r e n c e s  a l o n g  s p e c i e s  l i n e s  a r e  
l e g i t i m a t e  w h i l e  t h e  o t h e r s  a r e  n o t .  
Y e t  a n o t h e r  s o r t  o f  d e e p - s e a t e d  p r e j u d i c e  
w o u l d  b e  s a n c t i o n e d  b y  t h e  W r a t i o n a l  
p r e f e r e n c e
w  
d e f e n s e .  I t  m a y  b e  t r u e  t h a t  
h u m a n s ,  l i k e  o t h e r  a n i m a l s ,  t e n d  t o  f a v o r  
m e m b e r s  o f  t h e i r  o w n  s p e c i e s .  
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t h e r e  i s  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  n o r m a l  
m e m b e r s  o f  s p e c i e s  a r e  o f t e n  f a v o r e d  w h i l e  
t h e  a b n o r m a l  a r e  s h u n n e d ,  d e s p i s e d ,  a n d  
a t t a c k e d .  T h e  v e r y  f a c t  o f  s p e c i e s  
r e s e m b l e n c e  s e e m s  t o  f u e l  t h e  a v e r s i o n  
s o m e  w h o  a r e  n o r m a l  f e e l  f o r  t h e  a b n o r m a l .  
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  m a n y  h u m a n s  h a v e  s u c h  
a t t i t u d e s .  R e c e n t l y ,  a  n e w s p a p e r  a d v i c e  
c o l u m n i s t  p r i n t e d  s e v e r a l  l e t t e r s  f r o m  
r e a d e r s  w h o  p r o t e s t e d  t h a t  h a n d i c a p p e d  
p e o p l e  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  s e e n  i n  p u b l i c .  O n e  
f o u n d  t h e  s i g h t  s o  o f f e n s i v e  t h a t  s h e  c l a i m e d  
i t  v i o l a t e d  h e r  r i g h t s :  W I  b e l i e v e  m y  r i g h t s  
s h o u l d  b e  r e s p e c t e d  a s  m u c h  a s  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  
t h e  p e r s o n  i n  t h e  w h e e l c h a i r . . . m a y b e  e v e n  
m o r e  s o ,  b e c a u s e  I  a m  n o r m a l  a n d  s h e  i s  
n o t . w 4 2  D i e - h a r d  " n o r m a l i s t s "  w a n t  n o  p a r t  
o f  t h o s e  w h o  l i v e  " w o r l h l e s s  l i v e s , "  e v e n  
w h e n  t h e i r  o w n  f a m i l y  m e m b e r s  a r e  
i n v o l v e d .  E .  g . ,  s o m e  a b a n d o n  t h e i r  
h a n d i c a p p e d  c h i l d r e n  o r  r e f u s e  t h e m  l i f e ­
s a v i n g  s u r g e r y  e v e n  w h e n  t h e  c h i l d r e n  c o u l d  
h a v e  c o n t e n t e d  l i v e s .  W h e n  a s k e d  i f  t h i s  i s  
h o w  t h e y  w o u l d  w i s h  t o  b e  t r e a t e d  i f  t h e y  
b e c a m e  m e n t a l l y  i m p a i r e d ,  w n o r m a l i s t s W  s a y  
t h e y  h o p e  s o m e o n e  w i l l  h a v e  t h e  s e n s e  t o  
l o c k  t h e m  a w a y  o r  s h o o t  t h e m .  V i v i d  
r e f l e c t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  a b n o r m a l  s e e m s  t o  
i n c r e a s e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  e x t i n g u i s h ,  t h e i r  
h o r r o r  a n d  d i s g u s t .  A s  t h e  a d v i c e  c o l u m n i s t  
w r o t e ,  w p l e a s e  f o r g i v e  m e  i f  I  d o  n o t  a n s w e r  
t h e s e  f o l k s .  T h e y  a r e  t o o  f a r  g o n e  f o r  m e  t o  
r e a c h .
W  
I t  i s  i r o n i c  i n d e e d  t h a t  t h e i r  v e r y  
u n r e a c h a b i l i t y  s h o u l d  b e  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  
r a t i o n a l i t y  o n  t h e  B r a n d t  v i e w .  
T o  s a y  t h e  l e a s t ,  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  s u c h  
a t t i t u d e s  c a s t s  g r a v e  d o u b t  o n  Y o u n g ' s  
a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  r a t i o n a l  p e r s o n s  ( i n  B r a n d t ' s  
s e n s e )  w o u l d  a l w a y s  b e  h o r r i f i e d  b y  t h e  
e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  h u m a n  n o n p e r s o n s  f o r  t h e  
b e n e f i t  o f  o t h e r s .  N o t  o n l y  h a v e  
e x p e r i m e n t s  o n  t h e  r e t a r d e d  a n d  s e n i l e  t a k e n  
p l a c e  i n  t h e  p a s t ; 4 3  t h e y  a r e  o c c u r r i n g  n o w  
i n  e m i n e n t l y  " c i v i l i z e d
w  
n a t i o n s .  A  1 9 8 6  
s t u d y  c o n d u c t e d  b y  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  
M a r y l a n d  S c h o o l  o f  M e d i c i n e  r e v e a l e d  t h a t  
o n e - t h i r d  o f  t h e  f a m i l y  m e m b e r s  w h o  
b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h e i r  h o s p i t a l i z e d  m e n t a l l y  
i n c o m p e t e n t  e l d e r l y  r e l a t i v e s  w o u l d  n o t  h a v e  
w a n t e d  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  a n  e x p e r i m e h t  o n  
t h e  a d v e r s e  e f f e c t s  o f  u r i n a r y  c a t h e t e r s  
n e v e r t h e l e s s  g a v e  t h e i r  p e r m i s s i o n .  T h e y  
r e a s o n e d  t h a t  o t h e r s  w o u l d  " p o s s i b l y  
b e n e f i t "  f r o m  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t .  
I n  s h o r t ,  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h e  " r a t i o n a l  
p r e f e r e n c e
w  
d e f e n s e  o f  s p e c i e s i s m  h a s  
b a c k f i r e d  i n  a n  e x c e p t i o n a l l y  h o r r i b l e  w a y .  
I  c a n  c o n c e i v e  o f  o n l y  o n e  r e s p o n s e  t o  m y  
c h a r g e  t h a t  t h i s  l a s t  d e f e n s e  " j u s t i f i e s "  
d e e p - s e a t e d  b i g o t r y .  S o m e  p e o p l e  ( q u i t e  a  
f e w ,  o n e  h o p e s )  a r e  a b l e  t o  o v e r c o m e  r a c i s t ,  
s e x i s t ,  e t h n o c e n t r i c  a n d  " n o r m a l i s t "  
a t t i t u d e s .  P e r h a p s  p r e f e r e n c e s  a n d  
a v e r s i o n s  t h a t  s o m e ,  i f  n o t  a l l ,  p e r s o n s  c a n  
o v e r c o m e  b y  v i v i d ,  i n f o r m e d ,  l o g i c a l  
r e f l e c t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  d e e m e d  " i r r a t i o n a l . "  
T h e  s p e c i e s i s t  c o u l d  c l a i m  t h a t  t h i s  
m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  B r a n d t ' s  w i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c "  
t h e o r y  o f  r a t i o n a l  p r e f e r e n c e  d e f e a t s  t h e  
b i g o t r y  c h a r g e .  
I n d e e d  i t  w o u l d - - - b u t  a t  t h e  c o s t  o f  d e f e a t i n g  
s p e c i e s i s m  i t s e l f .  S o m e  o f  u s ,  i f  n o t  a l l  o f  
u s ,  h a v e  a l t e r e d  o u r  b e l i e f  t h a t  a n y  m e m b e r  
o f  o u r  s p e c i e s  s h o u l d  b e  f a v o r e d  o v e r  a n y  
s e n t i e n t  m e m b e r  o f  a n o t h e r  s p e c i e s .  
T h u n d e r s t r u c k  b y  t h e  a r g u m e n t  f r o m  
m a r g i n a l  c a s e s ,  w e  h a v e  r a c k e d  o u r  b r a i n s  
t o  f i n d  a  m o r a l l y  r e l e v a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  
9 3  





between nonpersons of our own and of other 
species. Finding none---as the earlier part 
of this paper indicates---we have rejected 
speciesism. The burden is on speciesists to 
show this rejection to be confused, illogical, 
or misinformed. So far they have failed. It 
is speciesism---not its denial---which 
appears to be irrational. 
Those who believe that human nonpersons 
are morally considerable and have a right to 
life should look for support to other positive 
arguments about the sorts of beings who can 
have moral status.45 I predict that they 
will find these far more promising than the 
attempt to defend speciesism. 
1See Peter Singer's classic, "All Animals 
are Equal," reprinted in Animal Rights and 
Human Obligations, T. Regan and P. Singer, 
eds. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 
1976), pp. 148-162. Cf. Tom Regan's "An 
Examination and Defense of One Argument 
Concerning Animal Rights," InQuiry 22 (1­
2), Summer, 1979, pp. 189-219. 
2For an extensive look at the challenge the 
argument from marginal cases poses to the 
personhood view, see my "The Personhood 
View and the Argument from Marginal 
Cases," forthcoming in Philosophica. 
3 Robert Nozick, "About Mammals and 
People," [a review of Tom Regan's The Case 
for Anima! Rights (Berkeley: U. of 
California Press, 1983)], The New York 
Times Book Reyiew, November 27, 1983, 
pp. 11, 29-30. 
4 B. G. Frey, Rights Killing, and Suffering 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 116 
5 Peter Singer, "Killing Humans and Killing 
Animals," InQuiry 22 (1-2), Summer, 1979, 
p. 153. Also see his "Animals and the Value 
of Life," pp. 366-371, in Tom Regan, ed., 
Matters of Life and Death, Second Edition 
(New York: Random House, 1986). 
6 Michael A. Fox. The Case for Animal 
Experimentation (Berkeley: U. of California 
Press, 1986), pp. 58-59 
7 lQl.Q.., p. 219, note 13. 
8 Two individuals could be quite different 
without differing in morally relevant 
respects, of course. Mary Midgely, in 
Animals and Why They Matter (Athens: U. 
of Georgia Press, 1983), pp.98-9, has 
attacked the analogy between speciesism and 
racism because species, but not .@il, 
results in important differences among 
individuals. This is true, but not to the 
point. The fact that some individuals like to 
have their ears scratched, or prefer to 
spend time in trees, or react to smiles with 
aggression, while others do not, indicates 
that their needs must be satisfied in 
different ways. It is difficult to see how 
such differences could be morally relevant. 
Midgley gives a second criticism of the 
analogy between racism and species ism in 
her very interesting book. She suggests that 
racism is an inherently confused concept; 
therefore, to the extent to which speciesism 
.i.§. related to racism, it is said to be confused 
as well. Midgley's main reason for asserting 
this is her belief that justified reverse 
discrimination often comes out as racist, 
although we assume that racism must be 
unjustified (p. 100). This doesn't seem quite 
correct. Such reverse discrimination, when 
justified, is not an instance of racism at all. 
Individuals, who may belong to a racial 
minority, are given preferential treatment 
because they are victims of past and present 
injustices, whereas their competitors are 
the (perhaps innocent) beneficiaries of those 
same injustices. I..bl.s.. is the morally 
relevant difference between the individuals 
involved, not their race. E. g., it would be 
absurd for a U. S. firm to give Idi Amin job 
preference over a poor white from a New 
York slum on grounds of reverse 
discrimination. Reverse discrimination 
properly applies to any victim of oppression, 
and is not restricted to @Qt!l. groups at all. 
Midgley argues that racists too claim they 
are motivated by historical considerations 
(p. 100). Regardless of what racists may 
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s a y ,  h o w e v e r ,  i t  i s  q u i t e  p l a i n  t h a t  i n  f a c t  
t h e y  r e g a r d  r a c e  a s  t h e  d e t e r m i n i n g  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c .  ( F o r  m o r e  r e f l e c t i o n s  o n  
r e v e r s e  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  s e e  m y  
" P r e f e r e n t i a l  H i r i n g  a n d  U n j u s t  S a c r i f i c e , "  
T h e  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  F o r u m ,  X I I ,  3  ( 1 9 8 1 ) ,  p .  
2 7 9 - 8 9 . )  
9  F o x ,  o p .  c i t .  ,  p p .  4 5 - 4 6 ,  5 1 - 5 6 .  
1 0  J o e l  F e i n b e r g ,  " A b o r t i o n , "  i n  M a t t e r s  o f  
L i f e  a n d  p e a t h ,  o p .  c i t "  p .  2 6 2 .  
1 1  P e t e r  S i n g e r ,  " K i l l i n g  H u m a n s  a n d  K i l l i n g  
A n i m a l s , "  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  1 5 1 .  
1  2  M i c h a e l  W r e e n ,  " I n  D e f e n s e  o f  
S p e c i e s i s m , "  E t h i c s  a n d  A n i m a l s  V ( 3 ) ,  
1 9 8 4 ,  p p .  4 7 - 6 0 .  
1 3 . 1 . ! 2 . i . d . .  p .  5 2  
1 4  " S p e c i e s i s m  N o t  J u s t i f i e d , "  E t h i c s  a n d  
A n i m a l s  V  ( 4 ) ,  1 9 8 4 ,  p p .  1 2 2 - 2 9 .  
1 5  M .  W r e e n ,  " M y  K i n d  o f  P e r s o n , "  B e t w e e n  
t h e  S p e c i e s  2  ( 1 ) ,  1 9 8 6 ,  p p .  2 3 - 2 8 .  
1 6  " S p e c i e s i s m  R e v i s i t e d , "  B e t w e e n  t h e  
S p e c i e s  2  ( 4 ) ,  1 9 8 6 ,  p p .  1 8 4 - 9 .  
1 7  M .  W r e e n ,  " I f  A t  A l l  H u m a n l y  P o s s i b l e , "  
i b . i . d . . ,  p p .  1 8 9 - 9 4 .  
1 8  " S p e c i e s i s m  N o t  J u s t i f i e d , "  p .  1 2 6 .  
1 9  " M y  K i n d  o f  P e r s o n , "  p .  2 7 .  
2 0  " S p e c i e s i s m  R e v i s i t e d , "  p .  1 8 7 .  
2 1  " I f  A t  A l l  H u m a n l y  P o s s i b l e , "  p .  1 9 3 .  
2 2  " I n  D e f e n s e , "  p .  5 0 .  E v e n  i f  t h i s  w e r e  n o t  
s o ,  p r e m i s e  ( 2 )  i s  u n w a r r a n t e d .  W r e e n  
s u p p o r t s  p r e m i s e  ( 2 )  b y  a r g u i n g  t h a t  i t  i s  
r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a l l e g e d l y  p l a u s i b l e  
c r i t e r i o l o g i c a l  c l a i m :  " I t  i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  t r u e  
t h a t  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  ' X  i s  a  l i v e  h u m a n  b e i n g '  
i s  g o o d  e v i d e n c e  f o r  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  ' X  i s  a  
h u m a n  p e r s o n . '  "  ( " I n  D e f e n s e , "  p .  5 0 . )  
H o w e v e r ,  a s  I  h a v e  p o i n t e d  o u t  ( a n d  W r e e n  
h a s  a g r e e d ) ,  a l l  t h a t  i s  n e e d e d  t o  d e f e a t  s u c h  
a  c r i t e r i o l o g i c a l  c l a i m  i s  t o  c o n c e i v e  o f  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i n  w h i c h  i t  w o u l d  b e  f a l s e  t o  
s a y  t h a t  ' X  i s  a  l i v e  h u m a n  b e i n g '  i s  g . , Q . . Q . . Q  
e v i d e n c e  f o r  ' X  i s  a  h u m a n  p e r s o n . '  I t  i s  
e x c e e d i n g l y  e a s y  t o  c o n c e i v e  o f  s u c h  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s :  e .  g . ,  a  n e w  b r a i n  d i s e a s e  
c o u l d  r e n d e r  a l l  o r  m o s t  h u m a n s  n o n p e r s o n s .  
O d d l y .  W r e e n  c l a i m s  t h a t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  w e  
c a n  c o n c e i v e  o f  w o r l d s  i n  w h i c h  a l l  o r  m o s t  
h u m a n s  a r e  n o n p e r s o n s  " d o e s n ' t  s h o w  t h a t  
b e i n g  a  l i v e  h u m a n  b e i n g  i s  n o t  g o o d  e v i d e n c e  
f o r  b e i n g  a  h u m a n  p e r s o n  i n  t h e s e  w o r l d s "  
( " I f  A t  A l l  H u m a n l y  P o s s i b l e , "  p .  1 9 1 ) .  H e  
c l a i m s  t h a t  t h e r e  w o u l d  s t i l l  b e  g o o d  
e v i d e n c e ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  e v i d e n c e  w o u l d  b e  
i n s u f f i c i e n t  o r  i n c o n c l u s i v e  ( p .  1 9 1 ) .  O n  t h e  
c o n t r a r y ,  t h e  b r a i n - d i s e a s e  e x a m p l e  s h o w s  
t h a t  ' X  i s  a  l i v e  h u m a n  b e i n g '  w o u l d  f i . Q 1  b e  
g o o d  e v i d e n c e  ( n o  o n e  s a i d  a n y t h i n g  a b o u t  
s u f f i c i e n t  e v i d e n c e )  f o r  ' X  i s  a  h u m a n  
p e r s o n '  i n  s u c h  a  w o r l d .  T h u s ,  p r e m i s e  ( 2 )  
i s  u n s u p p o r t e d .  
2 3  S e e  F e i n b e r g ' s  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s  o f  t h e s e  
v i e w s  i n  " A b o r t i o n , "  o p .  c i t . ,  p p .  2 6 6 - 7 .  H e  
b e l i e v e s  t h a t  b o t h  v i e w s  a r e  i n f e c t e d  b y  " a  
f a t a l  l o g i c a l  e r r o r . "  I  d i s a g r e e .  S e e  m y  "  
M o r a l  A g e n t s  a n d  M o r a l  P a t i e n t s , "  r e a d  a t  
t h e  P a c i f i c  D i v i s i o n  M e e t i n g  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a n  
P h i l o s o p h i c a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  i n  S a n  F r a n c i s c o  i n  
M a r c h ,  1 9 8 7 ,  a n d  f o r t h c o m i n g  i n  B e t w e e n  
t h e  S p e c i e s ,  n o t e  1 3 .  
2 4  M .  A .  F o x ,  o p .  c i t . ,  p .  6 3 .  I r o n i c a l l y ,  F o x  
i s  i n  n o  p o s i t i o n  t o  a r g u e  i n  t h i s  w a y .  F i r s t ,  
i t  c o n t r a d i c t s  h i s  r e p e a t e d  c l a i m  t h a t  . Q . . . O . . . ! y  
p e r s o n s  ( m o r a l  a g e n t s )  c a n  h a v e  b a s i c  m o r a l  
r i g h t s  ( e .  g . ,  p .  5 1 ,  5 2 ,  a n d  5 4 ) .  A c c o r d i n g  
t o  s t r o n g  s p e c i e s i s m ,  n o n p e r s o n s  c a n  b e  s a i d  
t o  h a v e  s u c h ,  r i g h t s  i f  t h e y  b e l o n g  t o  t h e  
a p p r o p r i a t e  s p e c i e s .  S e c o n d ,  o n e  m u s t  b e  
m o r a l l y - c o n s i d e r a b l e - - - " a n  e n d  i n  o n e s e l f " ­
- - t o  h a v e  b a s i c  r i g h t s ,  b u t  F o x  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  
t h o s e  w h o  c a n n o t  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  a s s e s s  t h e i r  
l i v e s  c a n  b e  i n s t r u m e n t a l l y  v a l u a b l e  o n l y  ( p .  
4 8 ,  p .  8 8 ) .  H e  m a k e s  t h e s e  c l a i m s  a b o u t  
a n i m a l s ,  b u t  t h e y  a p p l y  t o  h u m a n  n o n p e r s o n s  
a s  w e l l .  T h u s ,  h i s  t h e o r e t i c a l  v i e w s  a r e  
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incompatible with the strong speciesist view 
he tries to support. 
25 Ih ;,.! 6
.L!oLI.lo!.., p. O. 
26 llllii.. p. 60-1. 
27 Midgley, op. cit., p. 22. Unlike Fox, 
however, she denies that this would require 
us to adopt a "human first" position. 
28 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1971), pp. 114-15. 
29 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 
op. cit., p. 316. 
30 Fox, op. cit., p. 60. He certainly does not 
rest his case for speciesism on this one 
argument, but it is now the only argument he 
offers which has not yet been refuted. 
31.l.!:lli!..,p.15 
32 See my "Must An Opponent of Animal 
Rights Also be An Opponent of Human 
Rights?," InQuiry XXIV (2), 1981, pp. 229­
41, especially, pp. 233-36; and my "The 
Personhood View and the Argument from 
Marginal Cases," forthcoming in 
Philosophica. 
33 Thomas Young, "The Morality of Killing 
Animals: Four Arguments," Ethics and 
Animals V (4), 1984, pp. 88-101. Young 
denies that he is supporting speciesism. This 
is because he thinks 'speciesism' is 
unjustified by definition (he defines it as 
'ignoring the interests of members of other 
species for no reason other than that they 
are members of other species' [po 89]). In 
fact, his position ( if correct) would support 
both strong and weak speciesism as I have 
earlier defined them. 
34.l.Ql.Q.., p. 98. Although Young writes that 
human nonpersons have "moral standing," he 
does not mean by this that they possess 
qualities which impose direct duties on the 
rest of us. He believes that anyone or any 
thing that persons care about sufficiently 
has "moral standing" and an "other-based" 
right to life (l.QlQ., p. 95). On this view, as 
Young would agree, a video cassette 
recorder would have "moral standing" and an 
"other-based" right to continued smooth 
functioning. Clearly, this is not 'moral 
standing' as we normally interpret it. 
35 R. B. Brandt, A Theory of the Good and 
the Right (Oxford: Clarendeon Press, 
1979). 
36 lllli!., p. 113. 
37 Young, op cit., p. 98. 
38 M'd I .I g ey, op. CIt., p. 124. 
39 .Lb..i.d.., p. 104. 
40 Brandt, op. cit., p. 41. 
41 Midgley, op cit., p. 109. 
42 Column by Ann Landers, September 22, 
1986, The Uniontown (Pa.) Herald-Standard, 
p.8. 
43 See Bradford Gray, Human Subjects in 
Medical Experimentation (Robert E. Krieger 
PUblishing, 1981). 
44 "Consent to Research on the Aged 
Questioned," The New York Times, October 
30, 1986, p. A-20. 
45 See, e. g., Tom Regan, The Case for 
Animal Rights, op. cit. Cf. Bernard Rollin, 
Animal Rights and Human Moraljty (Buffalo: 
Prometheus Press, 1981). I have suggested 
another positive argument in my "Moral 
Agents and Moral Patients," op. cit. 
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